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THE UNITED STATES' CLAIMS OF CUSTOMARY
LEGAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION
On December 10, 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (Convention or LOS Convention)' opened for signature. The Convention creates a comprehensive legal framework concerning all the political and
legal issues that result from the interaction between society and the world's
marine environment.2 The Convention is the product of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)' convened by the
4
United Nations to remedy the defects in the existing law of the sea.
1. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature December 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 Iwr'L LEGAL MATERutLS 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Convention or LOS Convention]. The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea essentially codified the customary law of the sea that existed at that time. See Maduro, Passage Through
InternationalStraits: The ProspectsEmerging From the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 65, 65 (1980). Since 1958, however, many nations
have made substantial new claims to various parts of the ocean including larger territorial seas,
continental shelves, and fishing zones. Id. Moreover, improved technology provided some nations
with the capability to mine the deep seabed and fish in distant waters. Id. The new claims to
the sea and the advanced technology created increasing pressure for new guidelines to govern
use of the sea. Id. As a result, General Assembly Resolution 2750C called for a conference on
the law of the sea to draft a comprehensive treaty dealing with all aspects of marine law. Id.
The first meeting of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III) opened in December, 1973 in New York. Id. Nine years transpired before UNICLOS III
reached a consensus on a draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention or LOS Convention). See Zuleta, The Law of the Sea after Montego Bay, 20 SA DIEGo L. REV. 475, 477 (1983).
UNCLOS III operated on the premise that all matters pertaining to the oceans are interrelated,
thus most nations perceive the treaty to be a "package deal," that is, a nation must agree to
the entire treaty because the Convention is an assemblage of rights and obligations. Id. at 477-479.
2. See Pardo, The Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 489, 489-490
(1983). The Convention is a completely integrated legal system regulating the world's activity
in the seas. Id. at 490. The Convention makes major innovative changes in numerous areas of
the law of the sea. Id. The innovations include a change in the concept of innocent passage,
introduction of the concept of a transit passage right through international straits, introduction
of the concept of archipelagic waters, the creation of a right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and the establishment of an international regime governing the deep seabed that will exploit the
seabed for the benefit of all nations. Id. at 490-491. Additional changes made by the LOS Convention include a change in the definition of the continental shelf and a recognition that scientific
research and the construction of artificial islands is a freedom of the high seas. Id. at 490.
3. See Pardo, supra note 2, at 489. UNCLOS III concluded its work on April 30, 1982,
when the conference adopted the text of the Convention after nine years and eleven negotiating
sessions. Id.; see Zuleta, supra note 1, at 477.
4. See Maduro, supra note 1, at 65. General Assembly Resolution 2750C convened UNCLOS
III to create new guidelines to regulate the marine environment. Id. The pre-existing law of the
sea, based on the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, was inadequate to deal with numerous
state claims to fishing, mining, environmental protection, and research rights. Id. To facilitate
resolution of the numerous conflicts and claims, UNCLOS III formed three committees. Id. at
66. The first committee addressed the issues pertaining to an international regime for the deep
seabed. Id. The second committee addressed the traditional areas of the law of the sea including
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The basis of the law of the sea prior to the LOS Convention arises from
the 1958 Geneva Conventions.' The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone reiterated the basic principle that the coastal state has6
absolute sovereignty over an adacent belt of ocean called the territorial sea
and limited jurisdiction over the area of ocean just beyond the territorial sea
called the contiguous zone. 7 The coastal state must give all states' ships the
right of innocent passage through territorial seas and international straits.,
The Convention on the High Seas defines the high seas and declares that all
states have the express freedom to navigate, to fish, to lay submarine cables
and pipelines, and to fly over the ocean.' The Geneva Convention on the Conthe territorial seas, economic zones, continental shelves, high seas, straits passage, archipelagoes,
and fishing. Id. The third committee dealt with marine pollution, conservation, scientific research,
and technology transfer. Id.
5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, done 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter
cited as High Seas Convention]; Convention on the Continental Shelf, done 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention];
Convention on the Conservation of Living Resources, done 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; see also T. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 183
n.3 (2d ed. 1973) (Geneva Conventions evidence current customary law).
6. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
7. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5, art. 24. In the contiguous zone, the.coastal
state has the power to punish infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations. Id. The coastal state, however, does not have complete sovereignty in the contiguous zone
because in the zone other nations have the right to exercise the freedoms of the high seas. See
T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 210.
The concept of an EEZ embodied in the LOS Convention substantially supercedes the concept of a contiguous zone. B. DUJNER, ThE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS OF MID-OCEAN
ARCHIPELAGOES AND ARCHIPELAGIC STATES, 14 (1976).
8. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5, art. 14 (guarantees right of innocent passage
in territorial sea); art. 16(4) (guarantees right of innocent passage through international straits).
The right of innocent passage is non-suspendable in international straits. Id. art. 16(4). Historically,
,,however, a problem arose with the concept of innocent passage because no definite rule exists
to define what passage is innocent and, therefore, the coastal state subjectively determined whether
or not a particular passage was innocent. Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other
TraditionalNationalSecurity Considerations, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 553, 560 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Law of Sea]. Article 14(4) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone declares that passage is innocent so long as the passage is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order, or security of the coastal state. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5. The standard proclaimed in article 14(4) is so nebulous that a coastal state may determine passage is not
innocent because of the ship's cargo, nationality, destination, or method of propulsion. Law
of Sea, supra,at 560. Thus, a ship will never be absolutely certain whether its passage is innocent.
See T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 204 (innocent passage difficult to determine because term
is imprecise); B. DUBNER, supra note 7, at 12 (concept of innocent passage vague because does
not apply equally to all situations).
9. See High Seas Convention, supra note 5, art. 1 (high seas are all seas not in internal
or territorial waters of another nation); art. 2 (navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables and
pipelines, and right to fly over oceans are freedoms of high seas). Hugo Grotius originally conceived the concept of freedom of the high seas. B. DUrNER, supranote 7, at 16. Grotius' purpose
in formulating the rule was to keep open trade routes for the Dutch. Id. He argued that because
the seas are so vast, no state can control them, and therefore all states should have free access
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tinental Shelf governs, in part, exploitation of seabed resources'" and gives
a coastal state the right to exploit resources in or on the seabed or subsoil
of that state's continental shelf." The 1958 Geneva Conventions have no provisions that deal explicitly with the deep seabed outside the margins of the
2
continental shelf.'
The new LOS Convention significantly alters the framework established
by the 1958 Conventions. 3 The Convention is a product of conflicting interests, and therefore some provisions protect the interests of developing nations
and other provisions protect the already developed nations.' The Convention
articles on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), for example, help safeguard
the developing countries' claim to an equitable share of the world's resources. '5
to the ocean and its resources. Id.
The four freedoms expressly articulated in article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas
are not the definitive list of high seas freedoms. Article 2 also provides that the exercise of other
freedoms recognized by international law shall be legal. High Seas Convention, supra note 5,
art. 2; see also B. DUBNER, supra, at 16 (art. 2 does not restrict high seas freedoms to those
expressly granted in Convention).
10. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 5, art. 1 (continental shelf defined as
seabed and subsoil adjacent to coast but outside territorial sea to depth of 200 meters or beyond
where depth still allows exploitation); art. 2 (coastal state has right to exploit natural resources
in or on continental shelf); see also T. BROWNLE, supra note 5, at 224 (major objective of Continental Shelf Convention is to provide stable basis for seabed operations).
11. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 5, art 2. The coastal state can exploit the
seabed up to the depth of 200 meters, or if the continental shelf goes beyond 200 meters, the
coastal state can exploit out to the depth where the shelf still admits of exploitation. B. DUBNER,
supra note 7, at 14-15.
12. See T. BRowNLIE, supra note 5, at 231. The United Nations' call for a Conference
in 1973 to establish a deep seabed regime implies that no regime existed before UNCLOS III. See id.
13. See supra note 2 (purpose and scope of Convention and area of law changed by
Convention).
14. See Richardson, The United States Posture Toward the Law of The Sea Convention:
Awkward but not Irreparable,20 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 505, 511 (1983) (Convention is "package
deal," thus Third World satisfies United States' navigational concerns in return for concessions
on Third World resource interest); Zuleta, supra note 1, at 478-479 (signatories' opening statements
that Convention is compromise document and thus package deal); 20 SAN DEGo L. REv. 679,
680 (1983) (Convention represents compromise).
15. See R.P. ANAND, OmrGn AND DEVELOPMENT OF Tra LAW OF THE SEA, 199 (1982) (EEZ
is concept which creates equitable framework to exploit ocean resources). An example of inequitable resource allocation that the EEZ supposedly alleviates involves the fishing industry in
which 90% of the commercial fish catch comes within the EEZ. See Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure
Movement: Inventory & Prospect,20 SAN DEGo L. REv.561, 580 (1983). The developed nations,
with less than 33% of the world's population, took 60% of the commercial fish harvest in 1970.
See R.P. ANAND, supra, at 199. The Kenyan representative, speaking to the Seabed Committee
of UNCLOS III, declared that a legal system which allows the developed countries to take a
disproportionately large share of the fish harvest is inequitable. Id. Speaking for the Third World,
the Kenyan representative further declared that a change in such an inequitable system was necessary.
Id. The development of an EEZ, however, might not help developing countries share equitably
in world resources because many of these countries have little or no coastline and thus lack a
sizeable EEZ. See Alexander, supra, at 576. In contrast, some already developed nations possess
broad coastal margins that are rich in living and mineral resources. Id. at 576-577. These broad
margin countries include the United States, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, Japan,
Iceland, Norway, and Argentina. Id.
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The relatively new concept of an EEZ substantially supercedes the concept

of a contiguous zone declared in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone.' 6 Article 56 of the LOS Convention provides that in the
EEZ the coastal state has an exclusive right to manage, conserve, and exploit

the living and nonliving resources which include resources in the seabed, subsoil, and water superjacent to the seabed.' 7 Moreover, the coastal state has
the exclusive right to exploit any energy sources in the EEZ and to regulate

any marine research in the EEZ. 1" Article 59 delimits the outward extent of
the EEZ as two hundred nautical miles from the territorial sea baselines."

Article 58 declares that in the EEZ all states will have the traditional high

seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as well as the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines. Article 58 also provides the right to use the EEZ
20
for any other legal purpose under international law.
In contrast, the Convention's provisions concerning right of transit passage
through international straits protect the needs of developed countries to provide mobility for military forces and commercial fleets. 2' The provisions on
a right of transit passage supercede the concept of innocent passage enunciated in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.2 2 Article 37 declares that the scope of the transit passage right applies to straits
used in international navigation for vessels coming from the high seas or an

16. See B. DUBNER, supra note 7, at 14 (EEZ is new law which supercedes concept of contiguous zone).
17. Convention, supra note 1, art. 56.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. 59.
20. Id. art. 58.
21. See R.P. ANAND, supra note 15, at 206 (maritime powers wanted to maintain freedom
of navigation); Richardson, supra note 14, at 505 (Convention benefits United States' interests
of mobility for military and commercial fleets). The developed countries, like the United States,
did not want the right of transit through international straits based solely on the right of innocent
passage. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5, art. 16(4). Because the concept of innocent
passage is subjective, the maritime powers wanted a more objective test that would guarantee
the right of transit. R.P. ANAND, supra, at 206. See generally supra note 8 (concept of innocent
passage is vague and subjective). The United States and other maritime powers also proclaimed
a need for a transit passage right because claims of a 12-mile territorial sea closed 116 straits
that previously had a high seas corridor. P.R. AN"D, supra at 206. Thus, the United States
conditioned acceptance of a 12-mile territorial seas at UNCLOS III on a guaranteed right
of transit passage. Id. at 207.
22. See Maduro, supra note 1, at 70 (Convention regime is sui generis); Oxman, The New
Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A.J. 156, 158 (1983) (Convention's right of transit passage more liberal
than right of innocent passage). See supra text accompanying note 8 (prior to LOS Convention
passage through straits based on innocent passage).
The concept of innocent passage still exists in the new Convention. See Convention, supra
note 1, art. 17 (innocent passage applies to passage through territorial sea). Innocent passage,
however, is less subjective under the LOS Convention because the Convention gives a specific,
objective list of actions prejudicial to the peace, good order, and security of the coastal state
which makes passage not innocent. Id. art. 19(2); see also Maduro, supra note 1, at 77 (problem
of subjectivity reduced because article 19 describes non-innocent actions).
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EEZ into other waters classified as an EEZ or high seas.2 3 Article 38 not only
grants an unimpeded right of navigation through international straits but also

specifically declares the freedom of overflight, a right not provided in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.2" Some experts believe
that article 38 and article 39 together establish that submarines have the freedom

to traverse an international strait while submerged,2" another right not provided in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.

6

The final relevant provisions of the LOS Convention pertain to mining
the deep seabed. Article 136 declares that the seabed and ocean floor (Area)"1
is the "common heritage" of mankind. " When ratification of the Convention is complete, the International Seabed Authority (Authority) will govern
23. Convention, supra note I, art. 37. The criterion used to determine whether a waterway
has achieved status as an international strait is the same as that used before the Convention.
Maduro, supra note 1, at 71. A strait is international if "used for international navigation." 1d.
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 38; see also Law of Sea, supra note 8, at 560 (right
of innocent passage does not include right of overflight or submerged navigation). The new Convention also moots the question of whether innocent passage allows the passage of warships.
Oxman, supra note 22, at 158. See generally T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 204 (international
law commentators divided on issue of innocent passage for warships under Territorial Sea Convention). Article 38 grants the right of transit passage for warships through international straits.
See Convention, supra note 1, art. 38 (all ships enjoy right of transit passage).
25. Law of Sea, supra note 8, at 560. Article 38(2) defines transit passage as an exercise
of "freedom of navigation," a term of art commonly recognized as giving submarines the right
to navigate underwater. Id. at 564; see Convention, supra note 1, art. 38. Moreover, article 39
provides that crafts shall proceed in their "normal mode", another term of art recognizing submarines' right to proceed while submerged. Law of Sea, supra note 8, at 564; see Convention,
supra note 1, art. 39.
26. See Law of Sea, supra note 8, at 560 (Territorial Sea Convention did not allow overflight
or submerged navigation as right of innocent passage).
27. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1). Article 1 defines the Area as the seabed and
ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond limits of national jurisdiction. See id.
28. See id. art. 136 (Area and its resources are common heritage of mankind). Ambassador
Arvid Pardo of Malta first articulated the concept of the seabed as man's common heritage in
1967. Zuleta, supra note 1, at 482. The idea of common heritage represents to developing nations
the notion of mutual exploitation of the seabed. R.P. ANAND, supra note 15, at 203. The United
Nations has taken two important steps prior to the convention that embody the common heritage
principle. First, a Moratorium Resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1969 declared that
all states shall refrain from any activity designed to exploit the seabed. G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). Further, the Moratorium declared that no claim to the seabed
will receive recognition until the creation of a regime to govern the seabed. Id. In 1970, the General
Assembly passed a resolution which provided that the seabed was the common heritage of mankind
and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. Declaration of Principles Governing the
Seabed &Ocean Floor, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GOAR, Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc A/8028
(197 1) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles]. The Declaration of Principles received overwhelming support, including the support of the United States. Arrow, The Customary Norm
Process and the Deep Seabed, 9 OcEaN DEv. & INT'L L. 1, 36 (1981).
The LOS Convention makes the common heritage principle operative by ensuring that developing countries will receive benefits from seabed mining. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 137
(rights in resources in Area belong to all mankind); art. 140 (activities in Area must be for benefit
of mankind); art. 153 (organization of activities in Area must be on behalf of mankind).
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the Area.29 The Authority will be responsible for establishing rules and regulations to govern mining in the deep seabed. 3" The Authority also will manage
the Enterprise, 3' an intergovernmental business that will mine the seabed for
the benefit of the Authority and the developing nations.32
One hundred and nineteen nations signed the LOS Convention on the
day it opened for signature.33 The signing nations represented industrialized
and developing nations encompassing every political and legal system -on the
globe. 34 The signatories, however, did not include the United States. 3 Presi36
dent Reagan announced he would not authorize signature of the Convention
because the provisions relating to deep seabed mining were not in the United
States' interests. 37 Reagan's refusal to authorize signature of the Convention
29. Convention, supra note 1, art. 156. The Assembly and the Council share the decision
making power of the International Seabed Authority (Authority). Id. art. 158. The Assembly
is the supreme organ of the Authority and the Council is the Authority's executive body. See
id. art. 160 (Assembly is supreme organ); art. 162 (Council is executive body); see also Oxman,
supra note 22, at 160 (even though Assembly is supreme organ, Council, by consensus, must
approve all legally binding rules and restrictions).
30. See Oxman, supra note 22, at 160 (Authority approves rules, regulations, environmental orders, and amendments to seabed provisions of Convention). The Authority has the express
power to approve contracts to mine the seabed but may refuse to grant a contract in only four
instances. Id. The Authority may refuse to grant a contract if the applicant performed poorly
under a previous contract, if for environmental reasons the closing of the proposed mining site
becomes necessary, if the sponsoring state would acquire too many mine sites, or if a contract
for the proposed area already exists. Id.
31. Convention, supra note 1, art. 170.
32. See Brewer, Deep Seabed Mining: Can an Acceptable Regime Ever be Found?, I1OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 25, 45-46 (1982) (Enterprise has full authority to become vertically integrated
mining company); Oxman, supra note 22, at 160 (Enterprise is intergovernmental mining company).
33. See Zuleta, supra note 1, at 475 n.1 (lists 119 nations which signed Convention on
opening day). The large number of signatories reflects significantly on the virtual consensus of
international opinion regarding ocean use and exploitation. Id. at 476. The number of signatories
is also great enough to establish the Prepatory Commission, an organization that will promulgate
the rules and regulations to govern the Authority once the Convention ratification process is
complete. Richardson, supra note 14, at 506. Moreover, the number of signatories indicates the
Convention easily should receive the necessary sixty ratifications to bring the treaty into force. Id.
34. See Zuleta, supra note 1, at 476 (never in history has such large and varied group of
countries signed treaty).
35. See Oxman, supra note 22, at 156 (United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, and West Germany did not sign treaty because of deep seabed mining provisions).
36. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (president makes treaties with advice and consent
of two-thirds of Senate); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(in area of foreign affairs president make treaties with advice and consent of Senate but he alone
has power to tpeak and negotiate).
37. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 505 (Reagan Administration believed Convention
provisions on deep seabed mining are not in United States' best interest). The Reagan Administration
had several objections to the deep seabed provisions. See 20 SAN Dmao L. REv. 679, 682-683
(1983). The President objected to production ceilings that might make seabed mining unprofitable.
Id. Furthermore, the Administration believed that production ceilings would discriminate against
seabed miners in favor of established land miners. Id. Reagan also disapproved of financial burdens
placed on developed countries through required payments of huge sums of money to the international organs that govern and exploit the seabed. Id. These economic hindrances significantly
decrease the chance that a consortium would attempt to mine the seabed because without a 20-year
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endangers United States' policy goals since the United States cannot derive
rights directly from the Convention either to guarantee the right of transit
passage through international straits or to uphold the United States' claim
to an EEZ.3 8 The question arises whether the United States can rely on the
Convention as customary international law to provide a right of transit passage
and an EEZ without binding American mining interests to the Convention
provisions that create a deep seabed regime.
In the traditional sense, custom is a generally recognized manifestation
of international law or a practice considered binding by the international
community.3 9 In addition, the statute governing the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) codifies the concept of custom into international law."0 Artiguarantee of unrestricted access to the deep seabed no company would gamble with the initial
outlay of $1.5 billion. Richardson, supra note 14, at 508. Reagan also balked at provisions that
limited access to the seabed on the basis of a company's nationality. 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
679, 683. Thus an anti-monopoly clause, which essentially guarantees that each nations' share
of the seabed will be equal, will limit the United States' allocated share of the seabed. Id. The
Administration did not like the anti-monopoly provision because the Soviet Union is self-sufficient
in minerals found in the seabed and the United States is not. Id. Reagan feared American security
interests might be hurt not only by the anti-monopoly clause but also by the Convention provisions that require mining companies to make the technology necessary to mine the deep seabed
available to the Enterprise. Id. at 695 n.115.
The Reagan Administration has taken the position that mining the deep seabed is a high
seas freedom analogous to the freedom to fish. Id. at 702. The view that collection of manganese
nodules is legal, similar to the right to fish, has some scholarly support. See Arrow, supra note
28, at 21; Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the GeneralAssembly Createda Law
to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TuiL. L. REv. 492, 496 (1979).
38. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 511 (failure to sign could endanger right to navigation and overflight); see also Zuleta, supra note 1, at 478 (view of most states is that one must
belong to Convention to derive any rights from Convention).
39. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 2 (custom is general practice recognized as binding); Gamble,
The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy: An Overview, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 305, 309 (1981) (custom is
recognized manifestation of international law).
40. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(l)(b) (international custom, accepted as law, applied in settling
disputes). The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is the principle judicial organ of the United
Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. All members of the United Nations are automatically parties
to the statute of the I.C.J. and, thus, have the right to use the I.C.J. to settle disputes. Id. art.
93. The I.C.J. has two basic forms of jurisdiction, contentious jurisdiction over conflicts between
states and advisory jurisdiction to address legal issues posed by international organs. F. KIRGIs,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15 (1982-83 ed.). The I.C.J. has contentious jurisdiction based on consent
of the parties, but a state's becoming a party to the I.C.J. statute is insufficient to supply the
court with jurisdiction. T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 695-696. The United States has filed a
unilateral statement accepting the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. See F. Kmois, supra, at 19. The United
States, however, qualified the declaration stating that I.C.J. jurisdiction will not bind the United
States in disputes that are essentially domestic. Crawford, The Legal Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International Court, 1979 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 63 (1981).
Some experts believe that the United States' conditional acceptance of I.C.J. jurisdiction is illegal. T. BROWNLE, supra note 5, at 703 & n.3.
The I.C.J. also has advisory jurisdiction. I.C.J. STAT. art. 65(1). The advisory power gives
the I.C.J. the right to give an advisory opinion on any legal question to the General Assembly,
Security Council, or other authorized international organization. T. BROWNLE, supra note 5,
at 705-706. The primary purpose of advisory opinions is to provide authoritative legal guidelines
to international organizations. Id.
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cle 38(1)(B) provides that the I.C.J. shall settle disputes by applying international custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law.4 ' In evaluating
whether certain practices are applicable as customary law, commentators bifurcate the concept of custom into the categories of state practice and opinio
of which are necessary to the creation of customary interjuris, both elements
4
1
law.
national
Though commentators hold conflicting views of what constitutes state practice, experts generally recognize several elements that embody the concept of
state practice.4 3 The concept of state practice consists initially of some form
of state action or restraint from action." Additionally, the states' actions must
be nearly uniform and consistent, encompass a sufficiently large number of
nations"s and exist for some duration of time."' Finally, a practice must have
the adherence of the specially affected states to become custom. 7
The initial step in an analysis of custom through state practice involves
determining whether any relevant state practice exists." In the case of the LOS
Convention, the numerous nations already exercising the right to claim an
EEZ amply fulfill the requirement of state action." Additionally, many nations
have either claimed or disclaimed that a right of transit5 passage or a right
to mine the deep seabed exists outside the Convention. 1
41. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.
42. See T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 607 (basic requirements of custom); A. D'AMATO,
THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49 (1971) (some type of state practice and
opin'o juris must exist to create custom).
43. See Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 1974-75 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 12, 21 (1974-75) (state practice involves quantity and consistency); T. BROWNUE, supra note
5, at 6-7 (state practice consists of duration, uniformity, and generality of practice); A. D'A ATo,
supra note 42, at 88 (state practice consists of act or acts of nations).
44. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 1-1 (state practice includes actions and claims by nations);
Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (restraint of state from pursuing certain behavior demonstrates state
practice); A. D'AMATO, supranote 42, at 88 (state practice includes only state actions). The I.C.J.
holds that claims by nations can constitute state practice. Akehurst, supra, at 5.
45. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 12, 16-17 (repetition of state action coupled with sufficient number of states participating in action creates custom); Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (sufficient number of states must participate in practice); T. BROWNLIE, supranote 5, at 6-7 (substantial uniformity of practice coupled with sufficient number of states needed to show custom).
46. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 15 (requirement of time varies depending on need for
repetition of practice); Arrow, supranote 28, at 3 (final element of custom is time); T. BROWNLM,
supra note 5, at 6 (no specific requirement for duration of time necessary if state practice is
consistent and universal).
47. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (substantial majority of specially affected nations must
adhere to practice).
48. See supra text accompanying note 42 (state practice is basic element of customary international law).
49. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 570 (since 1974, 56 countries have claimed an EEZ);
R.P. ANAND, supra note 15, at 218 (EEZ accepted as fact before Convention); Howard, The
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy,
16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 321, 332 (1981) (EEZ was customary law even before Convention signed).
50. See Zuleta, supra note 1, at 478 (United States claims transit passage right is custom
but most nations believe rights conferred only on signatories); Comment, The InternationalSeabed Authority Decision Making Process:Does it Give a ProportionateVoice to the Participants
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The next step in the analysis is to determine whether participation in the
relevant state practice is extensive and uniform.5 1 While states' practices need
not be absolutely uniform, custom requires substantial uniformity of action
by a sufficiently large number of nations.5 2 In the North Sea ContinentalShelf
Cases (North Sea Cases),5 3 the I.C.J. held that in the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf the equidistance principle"4 did not represent custom,
partly because an insufficient number of nations ratified or acceded 55 to the

Convention. 56
Another element of the analysis involves an inquiry into the sufficiency
of the passage of time.5 7 Commentators recognize that the elevation of state
58
practice to the status of customary law requires the passage of some time.
Yet, the question of time remains a flexible standard in that no specific requirement of time is set, especially when consistent state practice is easily
demonstrable.5 9 In the North Sea Cases, the I.C.J. held that a short time span
does not necessarily bar formation of custom as long as the practice receives
acceptance on a widespread and representative basis. 6° The element of time
is less important today because the actions of all nations are known immediately
worldwide. 6 The communication revolution makes the number of states participating in a practice more important than the amount of time over which
that practice has occurred since states' actions and reactions are readily
Interests in Deep Sea Mining?, 20 SAN Drao L. Ray. 659, 663 (1983) (developing nations view
seabed exploitation outside Convention as illegal, while United States believes common heritage
principle is non-binding).
51. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4, 43
(widespread and representative participation might suffice to show custom); T. BROwNrU, supra
note 5, at 6-7 (substantial uniformity of practice coupled with substantial number of states needed
to show custom).
52. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43 (substantial uniformity by sufficiently large
number of states necessary to show custom).
53. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4. See generally
infra text accompanying notes 100-131 (discussing facts and holding of North Sea Cases).
54. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 5, art. 6(2). The equidistance principle
holds that if adjacent states cannot agree on a delimitation of the continental shelf, then the
delimitation process will proceed by drawing a boundary line so that each point on the line is
equidistant from the adjacent states' baselines. Id. Germany did not want to use the equidistance
principle because the German coast is concave, thus the use of the equidistance principle by the
states adjacent to Germany limits Germany's continental shelf. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
at 18; see also id. at 17 (diagram showing effect of equidistance principle on concave coast).
55. See T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 586 (accession occurs when state which did not
sign treaty formally accepts provisions of treaty).
56. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 25, 42. Forty-nine nations signed and thirty-nine
ratified or acceded to the treaty. Id. The I.C.J. held that the number of ratifications and accessions was insufficient to show custom. Id.
57. See supratext accompanying note 46 (passage of time is one element necessary to create
custom).
58. Id.
59. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (time element is flexible); T. BROWNLIE, supra note
5, at 6 (if consistent and uniform practice exists, no particular duration required).
60. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43.
61. Akehurst, supra note 43, at 16.
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Several commentators contend that in special circumstances

63
a single incident can establish customary law.
The final element needed to show consistent state practice is the adherence

to the custom by states specially affected by the practice."1 State practice can-

not constitute customary international law unless the states most affected by
the practice comply with the practice as custom. 6" For example, customary
law on the law of the high seas could solidify only with the concurrence of
the maritime powers. 66 The view that specially affected nations' concurrence
is necessary to create custom has8 received the support of the I.C.J.6 7 and international law commentators.'
A demonstration of consistent state practice alone will not establish
customary international law because the existence of opinio juris is also
necessary to create custom." Opini o juris means that nations believe a practice is binding. 7 ' State action or inaction results, therefore, from a nation's
perceived obligation to act in a certain manner, 7 ' and not from notions of
comity or inability to act or on the basis of mere habit." In the North Sea
62. See id. (number of states participating in custom more important than duration of practice); T. BROWNLm, supra note 5,at 6 (if consistent, uniform state practice exists then no particular
duration required).
63. See 1950 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N 5 (1950) (two experts agree that custom can arise
at once); Cheng, UnitedNations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" InternationalCustomary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965) (no need for repeated usage if countries involved believe
custom is legally binding); Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of
InternationalLaw, 49 CALIF. L. Rav. 419, 420-421 (1961) (usage need not be of long duration).
For example, the principle that nations have sovereignty over their airspace arose the instant
World War I started, when planes first came into use for military purposes. Akehurst, supra
note 43, at 15. In the North Sea Cases, the I.C.J. indicates that a single incident (signing a convention) might create custom if state practice is extensive and virtually uniform. 1969 I.C.J. at
42; see also A. D'AMATo, supra note 42, at 120 (I.C.J. went to great lengths to affirm that treaties
can generate customary law).
64. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (substantial majority of specially affected states must
adhere to practice).
65. Id.
66. See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, 1950 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 376,
394 (1950) (conduct of maritime powers is crucial in determining law of sea).
67. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43 (adherence of substantial majority of specially
affected nations is necessary to create custom).
68. See I D. O'CONNEIL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 18 (2d ed. 1970) (states' abstention from
protesting against particular practice is significant to show custom only when states' vital interests are concerned); Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (substantial number of specially affected states
must adhere for practice to become custom); Lauterpacht, supra note 66, at 394 (conduct of
maritime powers is crucial in determining law of sea).
69. See supra text accompanying note 42 (both state practice and opiniojuris are essential
components of custom).
70. Arrow, supra note 28, at 3; T. BRowNLiE, supra note 5, at 7.
71. See supra text accompanying note 70 (opiniojuris based on states' notion that practice
is obligatory).
72. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 44 (habitual nature of practice insufficient to show
custom); Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 (opinio juris does not occur when state bases its practice
on comity or inability to act); T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 8 (state practice must rest on sense
of legal obligation, not motives of courtesy, fairness, or morality).
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Cases, the I.C.J. held that a practice is custom only if a nation believes the
practice is obligatory under a binding rule of international law. 3 Notwithstand"
ing the historical requirement of opinio juris,7
' conflicting views exist about
the exact meaning of the term. Other than the traditional view stated in the
North Sea Cases"-and article 38 of the I.C.J. statutes,76 some commentators
believe that the doctrine of opinio juris is a contradiction in terms that provides no basis for determining what emerging custom will be law."' Experts
also question the usefulness of opinio juris because statemen's motives are
often obscure, and thus determining whether a state believed its actions were
obligatory under customary law is impossible. 8 One commentator, therefore,
has theorized that to satisfy the element of opinio juris some articulation of
a practice as custom must appear. 9 Opiniojuris exists in this view whenever
some public statement appears that characterizes a particular principle as
custom.80 A similar view of the concept states that unless evidence to the contrary is available opinio juris is presumptively present. 8' Finally, some experts
maintain that the concept of protest and acquiescence is the basis of opinio
juris.12 Under this doctrine, the protest of a sufficient number of states will
prevent an emerging practice from becoming customary law.8 3 Conversely,
if an ample number of states acquiesce in allowing states' actions, the uncontested action will eventually become custom.8
73. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43.

74. See Arrow, supra note 28, at 3 n.7 (historical requirement of opinio juris dates back
to late eighteenth century).
75. See supra text accompanying note 73 (North Sea Cases definition of opinio juris).
76. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 38 (I.C.J. shall apply custom as evidence of general practice accepted
as law).
77. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 32; A. D'AMATo, supra note 42, at 51-52. The traditional view of opinio juris has some analytical difficulties because opinio juris seems to require
a state to believe a principle is already customary law before the principle becomes law. Akehurst,
supra note 43, at 32. The feature of opinio juris which requires state belief that a practice is
customary law before the practice actually becomes custom makes the doctrine of opinio juris
a contradiction in terms. A. D'AMATO, supra note 42, at 51. Thus, the element of opinio juris
is impossible to demonstrate. Id.
78. See A. D'AMATo, supra note 42, at 51-52 (contention that opinio juris is impossible
to prove because nations motives are unknowable).
79. See A. D'AMATO, supranote 42, at 74. Opiniojuris occurs whenever a publicized statement exists that contends a certain principle is custom. Id. Journals, textbooks, and reports of
legal decisions are prime examples of sources that articulate a principle as custom thereby giving
other states notice that the principle is custom. Id. at 85-86; see also Akehurst, supra note 43,
at 37 (opinio juris based on nations' comments about content of customary law even if state
does not honestly believe the practice is custom).
80. See A. D'AfATo, supra note 42, at 74.
81. Akehurst, supra note 43, at 34 (if consistent state practice exists, courts should assume
practice is custom unless evidence of opinio non-juris exists).
82. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 39. If states acquiesce to another state's action, a permissive rule of customary law arises, and, conversely, if a state's actions encounter protests, the
legality of the action is doubtful. Id.; see also A. D'AMATO, supra note 42, at 68 (one group
of experts equates opinio juris with consent, acquiescence, or lack of protest).
83. See supra note 82 (protest can prevent custom from arising).
84. Id. (acquiescence in state practice can cause act to become custom).
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The concept of protest and acquiescence directly relates to another principle of international law known as the rule of dissent which allows an individual
state to prevent an emerging custom from becoming binding on that state by
opposing the customary rule at its inception and consistently thereafter. 5 In
the Fisheries Case,8 6 the I.C.J. recognized the rule of dissent, holding that
the rule limiting territorial sea baselines to not more than ten miles across
bays was not applicable to Norway because Norway had opposed every attempt
to apply the ten-mile rule to the Norwegian Coast. 7 The Reagan administration similarly believed the deep seabed provisions of the LOS Convention did
not apply to the United States because the United States dissented to the Third
World's interpretation of the common heritage principle."8 To claim a right
of transit passage or an EEZ, however, the United States must show that the
relevant provisions of the Convention either create or embody customary law. 9
Most experts believe that treaties can supply evidence of customary law.9"
Treaties either can codify pre-existing custom or can provide the impetus for
the creation of new custom.' The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
85. See Akehurst, supra note 43, at 24 (state can prevent emerging custom from becoming
binding by opposing rule in earliest days of formation and persistently opposing rule thereafter);
Arrow, supra note 28, at 4 (persistent and timely protest by state may render emerging custom
inapplicable against protesting state). Once a custom has become binding on a state, that state
is bound forever. Akehurst, supra note 43, at 24. The protesting state must disclaim the custom
before the custom becomes well established. Id. Moreover, if a state protests a custom in the
formative period but ceases to protest thereafter, the custom will become binding. Id.
86. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116. In the FisheriesCase, England attempted to limit Norway's right to draw baselines for Norway's territorial sea. See F. KIROiS, supra
note 40, at 63. Along Norway's north coast the Norwegian government drew straight baselines
along the seaward points of the skyjaerguard, 120,000 small islands which dot the coast. Id.
By measuring the territorial sea from the skyjaerguard baselines, Norway seriously cut back
England's traditional right to fish in the area. Id. at 64. England asserted that Norway should
measure the baseline from the coastline, not the skyjaerguard, and that Norway should use baselines
that contour the coastline, except that across bays less than 10 miles wide the use of straight
baselines would be permissible. Id. The I.C.J. held that Norway could draw baselines along the
skyjaerguard because England acquiesced in Norway's action. FisheriesCase, 1951 I.C.J. at 139.
Moreover, the rule limiting straight baselines would not apply to Norway because Norway always
had opposed the 10-mile rule. Id. at 131.
87. 1951 I.C.J. at 131; see also supra note 86 (FisheriesCase).
88. See Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention & Third States, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 541
n.3 (1983) (Reagan Administration officials claim that American mining interests cannot be bound
to deep seabed regime without consent of United States to LOS Convention).
89. See id. at 552. Non-signatory states asserting rights under the Convention must
demonstrate the asserted rights are customary international law. Id.
90. See Akehurst, supra note 43-44 (treaties can create custom but must also have element
of opiniojuris);T. BROWNLE, supra note 5, at 11 (law-making treaties can create custom). Not
all treaties, however, are capable of creating custom. T. BROWNLIE, supra, at 12 (treaties executed
to accomplish a single enterprise cannot create custom); A. D'AmATo, supra note 42, at 106 (treaties
that create international regimes cannot establish custom).
91. See North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42 (one recognized method of creating custom
is transformation of general rule in convention into custom when general rule acquires opinio
juris); A. D'AMATo, supra note 42, at 104 (treaties have profound effect on customary law for
non-parties); Lee, supra note 88, at 553 (by process of codification and progressive development
of customary law, treaties crystallize customary international law).
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codifies the principle that treaties can embody custom. 92 Generally, treaties
that speak in a declaratory mode, promulgating general rules, are capable of
creating custom. 93 Certain types of treaties are also likely to create or evidence
custom, including treaties which add precision to previous customary law94

or treaties which create new law when dissatisfaction with the prior law exists. 5
In contrast, certain types of treaties cannot create customary law. 96 A treaty
executed solely to accomplish a single objective will not create custom.

97

Furthermore, a treaty establishing an international organization or regime will
not create custom if the treaty merely declares the rules that govern the
organization or regime.98 These types of treaties do not create or evidence

custom because they declare specific rules that are incapable of creating the
broad, generalized standards that are the basis of customary law. 99
In the North Sea Cases, the I.C.J. analyzed whether a convention could
92. Vienna Convention of Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted
in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 670 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Article 38 of
the Vienna Convention provides that nothing in the Convention precludes a rule set forth in
a treaty from becoming binding on non-parties as a customary rule of law. Vienna Convention,
supra, art. 38.
The Vienna Convention is the United Nations treaty that specifically addresses the issues
of treaty law and interpretation. See I. Sn cLARi,
THE VMITNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TaErsAs,
10 (1973). The Vienna Convention governs the formation, operation, and termination of treaties.
Id. at 6. The Vienna Convention also defines the rights and obligations of non-signatory states.
See Vienna Convention, supra, art. 35-36 (treaty does not create rights or obligations for third
state without third states' consent). For the United States to receive the benefit of an EEZ or
a right of transit passage from the LOS Convention, the United States must show either the
parties to the Convention intended the United States to have these benefits or the rights under
the Convention are customary law. Lee, supra note 88, at 546, 553. From statements made at
the opening ceremony, the intent of the signatories of the LOS Convention not to confer any
benefits on the United States is clear. See id. at 552. The United States, therefore, must demonstrate
that an EEZ and a right of transit passage are custom to derive any benefits from the Convention. Id. at 553.
93. T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 12; A. D'AMATO, supra note 42, at 107. Examples of
treaties which create general norms that bind all nations include the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 (on neutrality during maritime war), the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (on illegal weapons
in warfare), and the Genocide Convention of 1948 (prohibiting practice of genocide). See T.
BROWNLE, supra note 5, at 12.

94. Akehurst, supra note 43, at 52.
95. Id. A treaty that resolves state dissatisfaction with pre-existing law will not create custom
if the treaty does not reflect or generate consistent state practice. Id. For example, capitalist
and communist states have conflicting views on compensation due for personal or corporate property appropriated by a foreign nation. Id. at 51. Capitalist countries claim full compensation
for appropriated property, while communist nations find no need to pay any compensation. Id.
Several treaties exist which attempt to settle capitalist and communist dissatisfaction with appropriation law. Id. at 51-52. No custom has arisen, however, because capitalist countries still
demand full compensation and communist countries still claim no compensation. Id.
96. See supra note 90 (types of treaties that can and cannot create custom).
97. T. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 12.

98. A. D'AmATo, supra note 42, at 106.
99. See supratext accompanying note 93 (treaties that create general norms can create custom);
see also A. D'AmATo, supra note 42, at 106 (only treaties with general, norm-creating rules can
create custom).
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create or embody custom.100 The North Sea Cases involved a dispute over
the continental shelf in the English Channel.'"' Denmark and The Netherlands
admitted that provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (Continental Shelf Convention) 02 delimiting the continental shelf did not apply
to Germany because Germany had not signed the 1958 Convention. 3 Denmark and The Netherlands, however, claimed that the 1958 Convention should
bind Germany because the treaty embodied customary law.' 4 The I.C.J. found
that the 1958 Convention did not bind Germany because the use of the
equidistance principle' 5 to delimit the continental shelf was experimental.' °"
The I.C.J. determined that the equidistance principle was, at most, lex
ferenda,' 7 and, therefore, could not be the basis for custom.' 8 In addition,
the treaty allowed reservations to the delimitation provisions that demonstrated
to the I.C.J. that no intent existed to make the delimitation provisions
norm-creating.'0 9 The equidistance principle, therefore, was inappropriate as
custom." 0I
In the alternative, the Dutch and Danish argued that even if the Continental Shelf Convention had not codified custom at the time of signing, the
number of ratifications coupled with subsequent state practice had placed the
principle of equidistance on the level of custom."' The I.C.J. acknowledged
that a widespread and representative participation in a convention might suffice to create custom, provided the specially affected nations" 2 also
participated." 3 The I.C.J., however, determined that the equidistance principle could not represent custom.'" The I.C.J. noted that under the 1958 Convention the primary method of delimiting the continental shelf was agreement
among the parties.'" The court held that the equidistance principle was a
secondary method of delimitation used only when the parties failed to reach
agreement." 6 The I.C.J. concluded that a secondary remedy was not capable
of creating custom because the principle was not stated as a general rule of
100.
also Lee,
101.
102.

See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 4; see
supra note 88, at 561-562.
North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 12-13.
Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 5; see supra text accompanying notes 10-12

(provisions of Convention).
103.
104.
105.
106.

North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 25.
Id. at 28.
See supra note 54 (equidistance principle).
North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 38.
107. See T. BROWNLE, supra note 5, at xxxv (lexferenda means law as it should be if in
accordance with good policy).

108.
109.
110.
111.

North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 38.
Id.at 38-39.
Id.
Id.at 41.

112. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68 (explanation of specially affected nations).

113.
114.
115.
116.

North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 42.
Id.
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law." 7 Additionally, the number of ratifications and accessions was not sufficiently large, nor did it include enough specially affected states, to create
custom.' As of the time of the North Sea Cases decision, the Continental
Shelf Convention had received thirty-nine ratifications or accessions." 9 The
I.C.J. concluded that this number was respectable, but not sufficient to create
custom. 2 The I.C.J. reasoned that determining why other nations had not
ratified would constitute mere speculation.' 2 ' Thus, declarations that states
failed to ratify for reasons other than disapproval' 2 2 of the 1958 Convention
provisions are merely conjecture.' 2 3 The I.C.J. held that mere conjecture could
not constitute a basis for concluding that non-ratifying states held the Con2
tinental Shelf Convention to be binding customary law.
The I.C.J. also analyzed the conduct of the nations that had actually used
the equidistance principle to delimit a continental shelf.' 25 The I.C.J. noted
that in fifteen cases the equidistance principle was the method used to delimit
a continental shelf. 26 In over half of the situations, the nations using the
equidistance principle either were, or became shortly thereafter, parties to the
Convention on the Continental Shelf.' 27 The I.C.J. held that the actions of
those nations already parties to the Continental Shelf Convention could not
supply evidence that the equidistance principle was custom., 28 The I.C.J.
reasoned that determinations of why states which were not parties to the 1958
Convention used the equidistance principle would be speculative. 2 9 The I.C.J.
therefore refused to infer that any state ever used the principle believing its
use to be obligatory under international law." 0 The I.C.J. concluded that the
conduct of the nations that actually used the equidistance principle provided
no evidence of the principle's customary nature because the element of opinio
3
juris did not exist.' '
The I.C.J.'s analysis of custom in the North Sea Cases controls in determining whether the LOS Convention embodies or generates custom.' 32 The
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 25.
Id. at 42; see also text accompanying notes 51-56 (sufficiency of practice).
North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
See Akehurst, supranote 43, at 49 (most frequent reasons for failure to ratify are iner-

tia and parliamentary complications).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 43.44.
Id.
See id. at 44 (I.C.J. stressed that both state practice and opinio juris must exist to

create custom).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 100-131 (North Sea Cases); see also A. D'AmATo,
supra note 42, at 120 (NorthSea Casesare most explicit opinion of I.C.J. regarding treaty generation
of custom); Lee, supra note 88, at 561 (North Sea Cases set conditions for convention to acquire

status as custom).
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LOS Convention's provisions on an EEZ and a right of transit passage fulfill
the primary requirement that only generally stated rules can become custom. '"
The EEZ and transit passage provisions possess widespread and representative
support, as demonstrated by the large and diverse number of signatories on

opening day.

3'

In addition, even the non-signatory nations overwhelmingly

embraced the right of transit passage.'

35

Although some expert opinion sup-

ports the contention that the right of transit passage will be custom,' 3 6 not
all commentators believe the United States' right of transit passage is secure. "'
The United States essentially has acknowledged that transit passage is not a

customary right through its willingness to give developing countries a twelvemile territorial sea in return for guaranteed passage through international

straits.' 30 Moreover, consensus at the Convention is virtually the only existing
actual state practice to support a right of transit passage, whereas prior state
practice amply supports the right to claim an EEZ. 39 In the Tunisia-Libya
Continental Shelf Case, the I.C.J. recognized that the right to an EEZ is
customary international law.1"' Thus, the consensus at the Convention, the
prior state practice, and the ruling in the Tunisia-Libya ContinentalShelf Case
clearly demonstrate that the right to an EEZ has the virtual uniformity of
state practice required to create custom. ' Whether the right of transit passage
meets the requirement for virtual uniformity, however, is less clear because
no actual state practice relating to transit passage exists and numerous states
have declared that non-signatories will not receive any rights.' 2 Assuming,

133. See supra text accompanying note 93 (treaty declaring general principles most likely
to create custom); supra text accompanying note 109 (I.C.J. holds that equidistance principle
is not custom because not norm-creating).
134. See supratext accompanying notes 33-34 (Convention signed by largest and most diverse
number of nations in history).
135. See Lee, supra note 88, at 563 n.101 (transit passage fulfills requirement for widespread
and representative participation because even non-signatories supported provision).
136. See Howard, supra note 49, at 332 (right of transit passage probably will become custom).
137. See Lee, supra note 88, at 559 n.81 (American Branch of International Law Association believes right to transit passage is not fully secure); Richardson, supranote 14, at 511 (failure
to sign treaty endangers right of transit passage); Zuleta, supra note 1, at 478 (view that transit
passage right is custom is not widely accepted).
138. See Lee, supra note 88, at 559 (conceding 12-mile territorial sea rights in return for
transit passage right effectively admits transit passage right not custom).
139. Comparesupra text accompanying notes 33-34 (Convention signed by consensus) with
supra note 49 (UNCLOS III all but formally agreed that EEZ was custom) and Law of Sea,
supra note 8, at 569 (same).
140. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J.
18, 74. The conflict between Libya and Tunisia arose when the two countries could not agree
on a method to delimit the continental shelf that is an integrated part of both countries land
mass. Id. at 32. Addressing Tunisian claims to historically used waters, the I.C.J. declared that
Tunisia could have used the concept of an EEZ, which the I.C.J. held was part of modern international law, to justify claims to historical waters. Id. at 74. Tunisia, however, failed to argue
for rights based on an EEZ. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113 (NorthSea Cases hold that widespread and
uniform state participation in convention might create custom).
142. See Lee, supranote 88, at 552 (most signatories intend non-signatories to receive no rights).
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however, that the LOS Convention demonstrates uniform state practice regarding transit passage, sufficient participation eliminates the need to show that
the right of transit passage and the right to an EEZ satisfy the requirement
43
for passage of time.
Even if extensive state practice supports the right to an EEZ and a right

of transit passage, the United States also must demonstrate the element of
opinio juris before relying on these concepts as custom.'

The theory of the

Convention as a "package deal' ' '45 makes a demonstration of opinio juris
difficult because most signatories claim that non-signatories will receive no
benefits.

46

The Third World agreed to provide a right of transit passage only

as a quidpro quo for other concessions at UNCLOS III.'14 The Third Worlds'
belief that signatories can withhold the right of transit passage from any nation
that fails to sign the LOS Convention demonstrates the practice is not binding
and thus lacks opinio juris.'4' The United States, however, can contend that
the package deal and the intent of signatories to refuse rights to non-signatories
does not demonstrate a lack of opinio juris. '49 The package deal theory essen-

tially labels the LOS Convention as a compromise document.' 0 Numerous
examples exist of conventions that incorporated compromise and eventually
rose to the status of customary law.'"' Moreover, certain expert opinion declares
that the intent to withhold rights from non-signatories is irrelevant because
subsequent state practice actually creates custom.' 5 2 In addition, the United

States can point to several factors that support the contention that opiniojuris
exists. 13 Primarily, the recognition by one-hundred and nineteen widely diverse
nations that an EEZ and right of transit passage are law demonstrates opinio

juris.1 1 The LOS Convention further corroborates custom by its prohibition
143. See supra text accompanying note 60 (North Sea Cases require little passage of time
if participation in treaty is sufficient).
144. See supra text accompanying note 42 (opinlo juris and state practice required to show
custom).
145. See supra note 1 (package deal).
146. See Lee, supra note 88, at 552 (non-signatories receive no rights).
147. See id. at 559, 566-67 (Convention provisions based on concessions between differing
groups of nations).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 (opiniojurisexists only when nations believe
practice is binding).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 150-152 (signatories intent irrelevant if rights claimed
are custom).
150. See Lee, supra note 88, at 567 (multilateral treaties always involve compromise).
151. See id. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone compromised on
issues of shipping, fishing, and military security, yet third states receive the compromise rights
as custom. Id.; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 5.
152. See A. D'AMATo, supra note 42, at 150-153. Limiting the scope of a treaty to the intentions of the contracting parties is open to objections. Id. First, the intent of the parties is difficult
to discern. Id. Moreover, the basis of custom is the behavior of the international community,
and therefore the signatories' intent is irrelevant. Id.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 154-155 (consensus and prohibition of reservations
partially demonstrate opinio juris).
154. See supra note 34 (Convention signed by largest consensus of nations ever).
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of reservations which, at least partially, demonstrates to the I.C.J. the bind-

ing nature of the Convention.' II The United States also can argue that because
the Convention is the product of dissatisfaction with pre-existing law, it likely
will achieve status as custom. 56 The United States' contention that the

signatories' intent is irrelevant will probably not, however, support a right
of transit passage. The signatories that intend to deny transit passage rights
to third states are so numerous as to nearly insure that no state practice will
arise based on the notion that transit passage is an obligatory, customary

right.'" Moreover, the United States may find claiming a transit passage right
problematic in the face of an American court's refusal to grant customary
rights to individuals whose nations had not signed a treaty embodying
custom. 158 In United States v. Cadena,1 " the Fifth Circuit reasoned that a
convention does not benefit non-signatories, even if the treaty embodies custom,
if no evidence exists that signatories intended to confer rights on
non-signatories.' 60 The Cadena decision supports the contention of LOS Convention signatories that the United States may not claim a right of transit
passage. 161
The common heritage principle, which declares that exploitation of seabed resources should benefit all nations, '62 is also a product of dissatisfaction
with pre-existing law. 63 Thus, common heritage has some basic indicia of
custom.' 6 The Reagan Administration, however, believes that the common
heritage principle is not customary law but rather a non-binding concept created
by a General Assembly resolution. 6 The United States does not oppose the
basic notion of the seabed as man's common heritage. 66 The United States'
opposition focuses on the Third World's interpretation of the common heritage

155. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110 (no opinio juris because presence of reservations indicates that law is not binding); see also Convention, supra note 1, art. 309 (reservations prohibited).
156. See supra text accompanying note 95 (treaty alleviating dissatisfaction with previous law).
157. See supra note 34 (Convention signed by largest number of nations in history); see
also Lee, supra note 88, at 552 (most signatories intend non-signatories to receive no rights).
158. See United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978) (convention confers no
rights to non-signatories unless parties to treaty so intend).
159. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
160. Id. at 1261. The Cadena decision completely ignores that the treaty in question conferred
customary rights regardless of the intent of the parties to the convention. Lee, supra note 88,
at 543 n.7.
161. See Lee, supra note 88, at 552 (most signatories intend non-signatories to receive no rights).
162. See supra note 28 (common heritage).
163. See R.P. ANAND, supra note 15, at 196 (common heritage principle based on Third
World dissatisfaction with inability to share in resource exploitation).
164. See supra text accompanying note 95 (treaty alleviating dissatisfaction with previous
law likely to achieve status as custom).
165. See Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the Common Heritage of Mankind, 20
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 521, 542 (United States believes Declaration of Principles is non-binding);
see also U.N. CHARTER, ch. IV (General Assembly resolutions are not binding).
166. See supra note 28 (United States supported common heritage principle by voting for
Declaration of Principles).

1984]

LA W OF THE SEA CONVENTION

principle as customary law.' 67 The Reagan Administration also believes that
in the absence of a uniformly adopted treaty embodying the common heritage
principle, the right to mine the deep seabed is a high seas freedom analagous
to the right to fish." 8 Reagan believes that establishing a regime outside the
LOS Convention to mine the deep seabed is possible by negotiating treaties
with other non-signatories who desire to mine the seabed. 9 Few industrialized
nations capable of mining the deep seabed will be willing, however, to sign
such treaties.' 70 Even in the absence of mining rights supplied by the Convention or treaties with other non-signatories, Reagan believes that the United
States can fulfill much of its resource needs by mining within the United States'
EEZ.'"' The Aleutian Islands, for example, are in an area with great potential
for seabed exploitation.' 72 The Reagan Administration's position that the
United States is not bound by the Convention provisions on the deep seabed
is correct because the North Sea Cases require the specially affected nations
to participate in an extensive and virtually uniform fashion., 3 The participation in the LOS Convention by the specially affected nations, those capable
of seabed mining within the foreseeable future, is neither extensive nor
uniform.' 7 The failure of the specially affected nations to sign the Convention because of the seabed provisions is not fatal to the proposition that common heritage is custom, however, if the principle was custom before the
Convention. '"I
The Third World nations argue that the common heritage principle is
custom because the United States has advocated the use of the common heritage
principle since 1966 and participated in the consensus that passed the Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor (Declaration of Prin76
ciples) which proclaimed the seabed as the common heritage of mankind.' '
The United States' approval of common heritage during the Declarations'
period of development may prevent the United States from effectively claiming the United States opted out of the principle by consistent dissent.' 7 Experts

167. See Brown, supra note 165, at 545-46 (developed nations believe common heritage has
no status as law until they sign a treaty embodying principle).
168. 20 SAN DEaco L. REv. 679, 702 (United States' formal position is that deep seabed
mining is high seas freedom).
169. See Brown, supra note 165, at 523 (Reagan Administration wants to establish seabed
regime by unilateral treaties).
170. See Larson, The Reagan Administration and the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN Dav. &
INT'L L. 297, 315 (1982) (industrialized nations will not sign exploitation treaties with United
States because treaties would adversely affect developed countries' foreign relations).
171. 20 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 679, 687 (1983).
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113 (North Sea Cases).
174. See Oxman, supra note 22, at 156 (countries capable of mining seabed did not sign
Convention).
175. See Lee, supra note 88, at 553 (treaty simply can codify customary law that already exists).
176. See supra note 28 (United States support of common heritage through Declaration of
Principles).
177. See supra text accompanying note 85 (early dissent to emerging custom required).
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contend that the United States is currently acquiescing in the common heritage

principle.' 78 In addition, the president of UNCLOS III has threatened to invoke the advisory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. and seek a declaration by the court
that common heritage is custom if the United States attempts to mine the
deep seabed.' 79 The United States' official view, however, is that the Declaration of Principles is a non-binding United Nations resolution.' 80 Support exists
for the view that the United States has dissented to the formation of common
heritage as custom by voting against the 1969 Moratorium and by passing
the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980.18" Thus, even though
the industrialized nations have supported the common heritage principle, the
rule of dissent should operate to prevent the common heritage principle from
binding the industrialized nations because these nations have consistently
reiterated the view that common heritage is a non-binding principle until a
convention codifying the subject is agreed upon.'8 2
After an analysis of the LOS Convention, a definitive determination that
any provisions of the Convention embody custom is unlikely. Ample evidence
exists that the right to an EEZ was customary law before the LOS

Convention. 8 ' President Reagan, therefore, should be able to sustain his claim
of an EEZ.' 84 Beyond the question of an EEZ, however, existence of absolute
rights is less clear.
The right of transit passage fulfills the North Sea Cases requirement for
widespread and general support by the international community. 85 The re-

quirement of consistent state practice may be difficult to demonstrate because
no actual state practice exists to support a right of transit passage beyond
the consensus at the Convention. 86 Moreover, international law experts do

178. See Arrow, The ProposedRegimefor the UnilateralExploitationof Deep SeabedMineral
Resources by the United States, 21 HARv. INr'L L.J. 337, 393 (1980) (Congress established common fund that will benefit developing nations in event of United States' seabed exploitation)
[hereinafter cited as Regime on Seabed Exploitation].
179. See Brown, supra note 165, at 523.
180. See supra text accompanying note 165 (General Assembly resolutions are non-binding).
181. See G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GOAR, U.N. Doe. A/7630 (1969) (Moratorium declared
recognition of seabed claims would not occur until regime established); The Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. The legal
premise of the Act is that deep seabed mining is a high seas freedom. See Regime on Seabed
Exploitation, supra note 178, at 338. Moreover, the Act holds that title to deep sea nodules vests
at capture. Id. The Act allows United States mining companies to mine the seabed under the
aegis of United States law. 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 679, 702 (1983). The Act also controls licensing
and issuance of permits to mine the seabed and attempts to afford deep seabed miners protection
from conflicting claims. Id.
182. See Brown, supra note 165, at 555 (industrialized nations claim common heritage has
no effect until included in acceptable convention).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141 (consensus at LOS Convention, state practice, and I.C.J. recognize EEZ is custom).
184. Id.; see also Proclamation No. 5030, 48 FED. REo. 10,605.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 134-135 (transit passage right has widespread support).
186. See supra text accompanying note 139 (no state practice to support right of transit
passage).
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not all agree that state claims alone can be the basis of state practice.' 8 7 In
addition to problems in demonstrating adequate state practice, the United States
will probably be unable to demonstrate the element of opinio juris.'8 Most
signatories believe that the right of transit passage can be withheld from
non-signatories.' 8 9 Thus, the element of opinio juris is missing because
signatories do not believe that granting a right of transit passage is obligatory
under international law.' 9 Moreover, in Cadena one American court refused
to grant customary rights to individuals of non-signatory countries, even though
the rights arose from a convention that embodied custom.9' The Cadena decision supports the LOS Convention signatories' contention that the United States
may not claim a right of transit passage." 9 If the United States cannot claim
ships will continue to have the
a right of transit passage, however, American
9
traditional right of innocent passage." 3
The LOS Convention provisions on the International Seabed Authority
will not bind the United States because the Convention provisions creating
9
the Authority are not broad, general rules capable of becoming custom."
If the I.C.J. declares the common heritage principle customary law, however,
the United States will not be free to mine the deep seabed, despite the Authority's lack of jurisdiction over American mining companies." 5 The United States
should be able to use the rule of dissent to deflect the effect of the common
heritage principle because the United States has consistently opposed the principle as binding law." 6 The mere threat, however, that the I.C.J. will declare
the seabed the common heritage of mankind creates a risk in deep seabed
mining that outweighs the mining companies' interests in investing the initial
capital necessary to mine the deep seabed."I7 Thus by creating a financial risk
the common heritage principle may preclude American companies from mining the seabed even though the United States has strong arguments that the
principle is not binding on the United States.' 98 Ultimately, Reagan's failure
to authorize signature of the Convention does nothing to help American mining interests but instead compromises the country's need for a right of transit
passage and further tarnishes its image abroad. 99
DAVID LAWRENCE TREAT

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See supra note 44 (conflict over what constitutes state practice).
See supra text accompanying notes 144-148 (no opinio juris).
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 159-160.
See supra text accompanying note 161.
See Lee, supra note 88, at 560-561 (non-signatories' right of innocent passage is still

custom).
194. See supra text accompanying note 98 (international regimes cannot become custom).
195. See Richardson, supra note 14, at 509 (if I.C.J. declares common heritage to be custom,
deep seabed mining outside Convention will be illegal).
196. See supra text accompanying note 182.
197. See supra note 37 (without 20-year guaranteed access to mining areas, no company

will gamble necessary $1.5 billion).
198. See supra text accompanying note 182 (United States not bound by common heritage).
199. Richardson, supra note 14, at 511.

